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Abstract 
This study explores how managers of microfinance institutions (MFIs) use trust-control 
mechanisms in the operation processes to mitigate the problem of mission drift arising out of 
the need to meet the dual goals of social development and financial self-sustainability. Using 
a case study methodology, purposive sampling, and replication logic, data from the 
operations processes of four geographically different sites of a microfinance institution in 
Gujarat, India were analyzed. The findings suggest that the managers of microfinance 
institutions balance integrity-trust, benevolence-trust, competence-trust, and control 
mechanisms to achieve dual goals of social development and financial self-sustainability. The 
conditions and contingencies under which trust-control mechanisms are most effective for 
mitigating mission drift are identified. The findings also indicate that managers of the 
microfinance institution use calculative and relational forms of trust to achieve the 
empowerment of women borrowers along with the fulfilment of the aims of financial self-
sustainability. Finally, the study places mission drift mitigation within its ethical context by 
examining client vulnerability and the MFI’s operational responses.     
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Introduction 
 Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) have two missions competing for management 
attention. One is the social development mission of poverty alleviation of its clients (the 
social goal) and the other is the increasing pressure to achieve financial self-sustainability 
(FSS). The need for FSS is based on the belief that earned income and profitability are a more 
reliable source of funding for social development compared to government subsidies and 
charitable contributions (Dee, 1999, p. 140). Previous research suggests that prioritizing the 
FSS objective over the social objective has generated accusations of mission drift (Arena, 
2008; Canales, 2012; Sheldon, 2012).  
 The term mission drift in this context implies that the focus on commercialization for 
FSS has driven some of the MFIs to emphasise profitability at the expense of achieving 
impact on poverty alleviation (Arena, 2008; Canales, 2012). According to the Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP, 2012), the incentives associated with high growth and 
pressures to achieve lending targets can lead to banking practices where the desire for 
profitability can trump good banking practices and thereby undermine the social goal. 
Mission drift therefore also has an ethical dimension. 
 The widely reported microfinance crisis in the State of Andhra Pradesh in the year 
2010, points to allegations of unethical lending practices causing heavy indebtedness of 
clients, and the use of excessive interest rates accompanied by coercive loan recovery 
methods. These practices indicate mission drift that negates the goals of social development. 
Therefore, it is critical that MFIs’ daily practices help to mitigate mission drift in order to 
achieve the social and the FSS goals. Sheldon (2012) concurs to suggest that managers of 
MFIs cannot escape from having to make difficult decisions on trade-offs in balancing the 
attainment of profitability with delivering anti-poverty social goals. Sheldon’s argument is in 
line with the economic analysis that centres around the necessity of trade-offs between the 
long-term goals of achieving financial self-sustainability for MFIs and the goals of outreach 
that argue for serving as many poor people as possible (Hermes & Lensink, 2007; Sheldon, 
2012; Canales, 2012). The argument in favour of prioritizing outreach over profitability goals 
focuses on the outcomes and effectiveness of microfinance programs in relation to the 
breadth and depth of poverty alleviation objectives.  
 However, while outcomes of microfinance programs (that is, the outreach argument) 
are critical for the poverty alleviation goal, they overlook the critical role played by the day to 
day operations processes in balancing the social and FSS goals for mission drift mitigation. 
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Therefore, in this paper, mission drift mitigation is seen as a process ingrained in the daily 
practices of micro-credit operations, and is defined as simultaneous achievement of the social 
goals and financial self-sustainability of the MFI. Such a perspective is not only concerned 
with how managers of MFIs balance the imperatives of the dual goals, but it also takes into 
account the context in which the operations of the MFI take place.   
 MFIs conduct their operations in a context of desperate poverty, and lack of 
empowerment for women (Chakrabarty and Bass, 2014). In citing Karnani (2008), Mair et 
al., (2012), and Rice (2010), Chakrabarty and Bass (2014) suggest that the economic 
vulnerability of women stems from social conventions where gender inequality in practice 
could exclude women from participating in market economic activities. They further contend 
that gender inequality can manifest itself in aggressive, unethical, and abusive behaviours 
toward women. For example, in the case of MFIs, abuse against women could be perpetrated 
by loan agents responsible for the recovery of loans (Chakrabarty and Bass, 2014). Thus an 
MFI’s drive for profitability could subvert the goals of social development. Therefore, the 
process perspective of mission drift mitigation argues for balancing the social and FSS goals 
in a way that protects both the clients’ and the MFIs’ interests.  
 From the perspective of the MFIs, dual organizational goals imply that the managers 
balance organizational coordinating mechanisms at their disposal in ways that enable them to 
achieve both objectives simultaneously, and avoid mission drift (Arena, 2008). Arena (2008) 
proposes social and governance control-based coordinating mechanisms as a key to mission 
drift mitigation. However, the present paper argues that governance and control mechanisms 
provide only a partial insight into mission drift mitigation and that sustaining trust-building 
mechanisms is also critical for the MFI managers’ ability to meet their goals.  
 In adopting the perspective of trust-building mechanisms, this research does not 
examine trust per se, that is, the trust of the MFI in their clients or the clients’ trust in the 
MFI. Rather, it examines the processes and actions of the MFI that help develop the clients’ 
trust in the MFI.  This is consistent with Shaw’s (1997) contention that collective trust can 
best be studied through organizational processes, practices, and structures. According to 
Shaw (1997) collective trust is not trust in and of itself, but the processes and mechanisms 
that help develop trust. Thus, the central question this research explores is how managers 
balance trust-building and control mechanisms in the operations processes of an MFI to 
achieve social and FSS goals. These actions contribute to mitigating mission drift. The trust-
control perspective is critical for gaining insight into how the MFI balances (a) trust-building 
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mechanisms to empower their clients, and (b) control mechanisms to manage loan-related 
activities.  
 The context in which MFIs achieve the trust-control balance is also pertinent in 
understanding the field-level activities of the MFI.  As suggested by Chakrabarty and Bass 
(2014), the MFI operations take place in the context of poverty and women’s 
disempowerment. Additionally, the relationship between an MFI and its clients is 
underpinned by a large power differential defined by the poverty and illiteracy of its clients. 
Such a relationship entails clients placing high levels of trust in the MFI. A trust-based 
relationship implies that the MFIs’ actions, rules, regulations, and procedures (i.e. trust-
building and control mechanisms) demonstrate that it is a trustworthy partner with whom the 
clients can confidently engage in loan transactions.  The exploitation of clients’ 
vulnerabilities, such as profiting through inflated interest rates would not only constitute 
unethical practice but would also negate the goals of social development through micro-
credit. A trust-based relationship between an MFI and its clients would ensure that women 
are empowered by engaging in market-led economic activities, assuming leadership roles in 
joint liability groups (JLG), making decisions on how and where to allocate money, and 
acquiring credit-discipline skills. Additionally, the women’s abilities to obtain cash for 
income-generating activities or to meet emergency needs for health and/or education needs of 
the family give them a certain valued and empowered position in the family. Therefore, the 
importance of trust-based effectiveness for client empowerment, supported by control 
mechanisms that achieve lending-related goals cannot be ignored.  
   To explore the role of trust-control activities in the operations processes of the MFI 
in this paper, the key trust-control concepts that constitute trustworthiness are first identified 
through a literature review, followed by methodological explanations. Then, the findings 
followed by a discussion of the research are presented using tables and diagrams under the 
five headings of (a) integrity-based effectiveness, (b) benevolence-based effectiveness, (c) 
competence-based effectiveness, (d) control-based effectiveness, and (e) overall trust-control 
balance effectiveness. Mission drift mitigation is subsequently discussed to establish it within 
its ethical context. Thereafter, a diagrammatic model is proposed which outlines key 
categories that conceptually integrate operations processes with the balance of trust-control 
approaches, and mitigation of mission drift.  
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Trust-Control Defined 
 Trust in organizational contexts has held an abiding interest among scholars (Desteno, 
2014; Kramer, 2010; Soren, 2010; Costa and Frankema, 2007; Cofta, 2007, Das and Teng, 
2001). However, a definition of trust has proven illusive. Much of the academic literature 
indicates that trust has been conceptualized in many different ways, and thus has become 
rather complicated to define (Banerjee et al., 2006; McEvily et al. 2003). One of the reasons 
for this definitional difficulty is that trust has multiple dimensions. It is discussed by scholars 
in economic terms as ingrained in self-interested behaviours (Bromiley and Harris, 2006), in 
sociological terms as governed by societal norms (Van de Ven and Ring, 2006), and in 
ethical terms as a principle of fairness (Banerjee et al., 2006) that ought to be pursued for its 
own sake.  
McEvily and Zaheer (2006, p. 287) suggest that “Despite the heterogeneity in 
theoretical orientations, many agree that at its core trust is the willingness to be vulnerable 
based on positive expectations about another’s intentions or behaviours.” The implication of 
this definition is that there are three necessary conditions of a trust-based relationship: 
interdependence, vulnerability, and risk (Banerjee et al, 2006, p. 308). Such a definition has 
direct relevance to MFI clients and their trust in microfinance institutions (MFIs). The 
inequality in the power equation and the information asymmetry between the MFI and its 
clients who are not literate in many cases suggest that in placing their trust in the MFI, clients 
open themselves up to the risks inherent in financial transactions with the MFI. At the same 
time, the clients would have an implicit expectation that the MFI would not opportunistically 
exploit their trust-based vulnerability. Kramer (2006, p. 74) discusses asymmetries in 
hierarchical power-dependence to suggest that “from the standpoint of those in a position of 
greater dependence and lower power, concerns about the motives, intentions, and concealed 
actions of those decision-makers who control their fate are likely to be consequential.” Thus, 
the MFI’s actions that demonstrate trustworthiness are central in building strong ties with the 
clients for achieving the MFI’s goals.   
 According to Casson and Giusta (2006, p. 346) “trustworthiness is an objective 
characteristic [that] cannot be directly observed.” Nooteboom (2006, p. 249) suggest that 
trust in organizations is behavioural trust which constitutes intentions, honesty, resource-
availability, robustness, and competence-trust. Thus, behavioural trust implies a combination 
of trust and control mechanisms. In the case of the MFI, its intentions and honesty (i.e. 
integrity-trust) for sustaining trust, its resource availability and robustness to achieve 
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financial self sustainability (FSS), and its competence are critical in achieving its FSS and 
social goals. Therefore, the question that arises is about those observable trust-control based 
behaviours or actions that indicate that the MFI is adequately focussed on (a) sustaining trust 
with their clients and (b) achieving financial self sustainability at the same time. 
 Dirk (2006, p. 22) cites Whitener et al. (1998) to suggest that behavioural consistency, 
behavioural integrity, participative decision-making, communication, and demonstrating 
concern are among many other behaviours that indicate trustworthiness. However, the three 
most salient characteristics that define trustworthiness, and which more often appear in the 
literature, are integrity, benevolence, and competence (Mayer et al., 1995; Post et al., 2002). 
This paper, thus, defines trustworthiness as a set of behaviours and actions that demonstrate 
organizational integrity, benevolence (i.e. calculative trust, and relational trust), competence, 
and control-based effectiveness.      
 The notion of trust as having extrinsic value to achieve economic as well as social 
goals (Nooteboom, 2006, p. 252) is useful in understanding the MFI and its dual goals. The 
economic analysis of trust rests on the assumption of rational economic actors acting on the 
basis of self-interest; they use calculative forms of trust to deter the opportunism inherent in 
trust-based relationships (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996, p. 251). However, Nooteboom (2006) 
acknowledges that “[trust] can also have intrinsic value, as a dimension of relations that is 
valued for itself” (p. 252). This is consistent with Bromiley and Harris’s (2006, p. 125) 
contention that a person’s behaviour can be assumed to be based on two different sets of 
assumptions, namely, either calculative self-interest belief or non-calculative belief. They 
further suggest that “This means that trust and calculativeness are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive; rather, [we argue simply that] they are qualitatively different constructs and each is 
potentially influential in different ways” (p. 125). 
 In the case of the MFI, lending money could possibly be open to opportunism by a 
client, and thus calculative trust such as incentives, community networking, and joint-liability 
groups play an important role in providing subtle forms of control.  However, at the same 
time, the MFI has a social goal of poverty alleviation necessitating building trust with clients 
that go beyond calculative forms of trust. Such trust (referred to as relational forms of trust in 
this paper) is what Nooteboom (2006) refers to as intrinsic value of trust: trust-based relations 
that are valued for its own sake.  
 Trust valued for itself can be equated with integrity trust and benevolence or goodwill 
trust. Nooteboom (2006, p. 249) defines benevolence as absence of strong opportunism such 
as “lying, stealing, and cheating to expropriate advantage from a partner.”  However, such a 
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conceptualization of benevolence trust can easily be confused with integrity-trust that implies 
honesty. This paper, therefore, defines benevolence-trust as the behaviours and actions that 
empower the clients through relational-trust and calculative-trust. For example, providing 
training in tailoring to the clients for generating self-employment is relational trust that 
empowers the clients, without benefit to the institution. Whereas, calculative trust is 
demonstrated by, for example, allowing the clients to form their own joint-liability groups 
that empower the clients, and at the same time, provide the MFI with an effective means of 
securing loan recovery. 
 Also, integrity-trust is defined as the behaviours and actions that demonstrate 
consistency between the claims (words) and actions of the trustee (Mayer et al., 1995), and 
the extent to which the trustee is able to keep the explicit and implicit promises made to the 
trustor. For example, the claim by the MFI that it does not use coercive methods for loan 
recovery has to be demonstrated in its actions when dealing with an actual credit default by a 
client. 
In the literature on trust, ability, competence, and expertise are used interchangeably 
as factors that affect trust. Mayer et al. (1995) reiterate that ability is an essential element of 
trust. They argue that competence connotes ability (p. 92). According to Zand (1972), trust is 
domain specific. Mayer et al., (1995, p. 91) concur in suggesting that skills and competencies 
are domain specific and those skills and competencies should be able to bear influence on 
that domain. Thus, competence, in this paper, is defined as those actions which demonstrate 
skills and expertise that impact the achievement of financial as well as social organizational 
goals. 
 Long and Sitkin (2006, p. 90) suggest that control is used by managers as a 
coordinating mechanism “so that resources will be obtained and optimally allocated in order 
to achieve the organization’s goals.” They further suggest that managers may use controls 
that enhance subordinate trust (in the managers and/or the organization). Such an 
understanding of control mechanisms is consistent with Nooteboom’s (2006, p. 249) 
contention that behavioural trust, among other factors, constitutes resource availability and 
robustness. This research, therefore, defines control mechanisms in its narrow sense as those 
mechanisms and actions that enable an organization to ensure that it meets its financial 
goals. This definition implies a substitutive relationship between trust and control 
mechanisms in the sense that financial-related control mechanisms would ensure that the 
organization meets its financial responsibilities (to itself and its clients) which would help 
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sustain client and/or investor trust in the organization, and at the same time, empower the 
clients through provision of credit.  
The Trust-Control Relationship 
 The relationship between trust and control mechanisms is complex in nature. It is 
widely debated by scholars but has not been definitively concluded (Soren, 2010; Costa and 
Frankema, 2007; Cofta, 2007; Long and Sitkin, 2006; Dekkar, 2004; Das and Teng, 1998; 
Bradach and Eccles, 1989). The trust and control linkage is conceptualized by various 
scholars as substitutive (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Dekkar 2004; Cofta, 2007) and/or 
complementary (Costa and Frankema, 2007; Das and Teng, 1998). The trust and control 
relationship in the context of microfinance operations is explored in this research to 
understand how managers use those mechanisms to address the needs of FSS versus clients’ 
social development needs. Thus, it is pertinent to ask if the trust-control relationship in MFI 
operations processes is substitutive or complimentary. 
 The substitutive approach assumes a relationship between trust and control in which 
an increase in trust reduces the need for control, and an increase in control reduces trust. The 
complementary approach assumes co-existence of the two. According to Costa and Frankema 
(2007), trust and control can reinforce one another and contribute to increased co-operation in 
a relationship. Soren (2010) proposes trust and control as a process, but suggests that the 
relationship is nevertheless complementary as far as both trust and control seek to balance 
and rebalance in an interactive cycle. The balancing and calibration view of trust control 
mechanisms as a process is consistent with Sutcliffe et al.’s (2000) model adapted by Long 
and Sitkin (2006, p. 93). The process model illustrates balancing processes among 
antithetical, orthogonal, and synergistic relationships between trust-building and task-control 
in organizations. 
 An antithetical relationship is demonstrated by managers when they use either trust-
building or task-control as a preferred method and as a consequence reduce their focus on 
alternate activities (Long and Sitkin, 2006). Such a view has direct relevance to the problem 
of mission drift. MFI mangers’ over-emphasis on task-controls for achieving financial self-
sustainability (and even profitability in some cases) at the expense of trust-building activities 
for enhancing client relationships would indicate mission drift. The orthogonal relationship is 
characterised by a combination of unrelated trust-building and task-control activities 
indicating a propensity toward mission drift. A synergistic relationship would constitute a 
combination of mutually reinforcing trust-building and task-control activities (Long and 
Sitkin, 2006, p. 93) indicating no mission drift. 
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Methodology 
 This study uses case-study methodology as described by Yin (1994). Two essential 
features of that methodology, namely (a) purposive sampling, and (b) replication logic 
defined the research design of this study. Purposive sampling in case selection was essential 
for availing full and unhindered access to a microfinance institution and for ensuring that the 
sites afforded  maximum learning opportunity. The geographical location of the MFI within 
India was also a critical deciding factor, as the researcher’s fluency in the local language was 
required to follow field-level operations.  
 The application of replication logic meant that the process of purposive sampling 
required selection of a microfinance institution with multiple sites. Confirming the findings in 
multiple sites helps increase the reliability of the results. Thus, four different sites in two 
different regions of the state of Gujarat in India were selected as the basis of the study. Literal 
replication (Yin, 1994) was aimed at achieving analytical generalization. Similarity in the 
operations processes was expected and predicted on the basis that the operations of the MFI 
at different sites were closely monitored by the head office.    
 The unit of analysis was the operations processes of the MFI. Observations of the 
operations processes were crucial for understanding the MFI-client interactions at the field 
level. Both deductive and inductive logic were employed (Audet and Amboise, 2001) to first 
derive trust-control categories and later to analyze the findings respectively. Trust constructs 
were derived from scholarly literature; this was conceived of as a necessary way to come to 
grips with a complex phenomenon such as trust. That was also considered an important step 
in achieving focus on the field-level observations. Data was inductively coded through 
different levels of categorization and then linked to defined categories.       
 All the operations processes were observed in the MFI’s day to day operations. In a 
few instances, such as loan-product strategy formation process and grievance redress process, 
where direct observations were not possible, the processes were discussed in detail with the 
managers of each site. Additionally, focus groups involving the managers and the staff were 
used as a discussion forum to clarify observations that needed further explanations, and/or to 
confirm observations made in the field.      
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Findings 
 The overall findings suggest that integrity, benevolence, and competence based trust 
supported by financial control mechanisms in the operations processes of the MFI play a key 
role in achieving social and financial goals of the MFI, thus mitigating mission drift. The 
context, conditions, contingencies, interactions, and client vulnerabilities under each of the 
trust-control based effectiveness are identified below. They are also summarized in Table 8.     
 Integrity-based Effectiveness 
 The analysis suggests that integrity-based effectiveness was supported by 
transparency of information, accessibility to operations processes for the employees and 
researchers, and consistency between the claims made by the managers about their financial 
products and the information relayed to the clients. Within the context of the illiteracy of the 
borrowers, the repeated oral transfer of information and the group test play a critical role in 
ensuring that the borrowers understand the nature of the product, the obligations, the 
responsibilities, and the rules related to entering into a financial transaction with the MFI. 
Many of the borrowers may not have had any previous experience of credit-discipline, and 
therefore processes such loan training and group tests are a key to reducing information 
asymmetry that exist between the MFI and the clients. Within the context of poverty and the 
lack of women’s empowerment (Chakrabarty and Bass, 2014), these processes are also initial 
steps in the empowerment of women. Table 1 summarizes some of the operations processes 
of the MFI that contribute to achieving integrity-based effectiveness. 
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Table 1 
 
Summary of integrity-based trust indicators in the operations processes 
 
 
Operations Processes      Integrity-based observations  
 
 
Compulsory Group Training 2 Repeated reiteration of information during 
compulsory group training ensures that the 
borrowers fully comprehend the nature of the 
transaction they are entering into with the 
MFI. Information exchange as indicator of 
integrity. 
 
Business Feasibility Survey The business feasibility survey ensures that 
prospective clients understand the purpose of 
the survey without raising their hopes or 
giving false promises. Information exchange 
as indicator of integrity. 
 
Promotional Meeting (w/ General Manager) Giving full and accurate product information 
to clients during the promotional meeting 
demonstrated transparency through 
information exchange.  
 
Group Test  The purpose of the Group Test is to ensure 
that clients have understood information 
about the nature of the transaction (the 
contract) they are entering into.  Information 
asymmetries are reduced through repeated 
information exchange and ensuring that the 
borrowers comprehend that information. 
 
Open Forum  The purpose of the open forum is to enable 
MFI clients and staff to raise issues of 
concern directly with higher management 
including the director of the MFI. This 
process indicates information exchange and 
transparency as important indicators of 
integrity. 
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 Benevolence-based Effectiveness 
 The findings suggest that benevolence-based actions of the MFI play a central role in 
achieving empowerment of the borrowers. It is constituted by both the calculative and 
relational forms of trust. The data indicate that while the calculative form of trust is used by 
the MFI to reduce risks arising out of moral hazard (i.e. the borrows failing to honour their 
side of the bargain), many of those actions, however, also achieve the goal of empowerment 
of women (see Figure 1 below). The relational-trust based actions are employed in micro-
lending activities such as seeking family and community support for the borrowers to engage 
in a relationship with the MFI. The relational form of trust used by the MFI empowers 
women, and at the same time, it indicates that the MFI goes beyond its minimum micro-
lending obligations to ensure that the women receive skills-development training for 
generating self-employment. Table 2 gives a summary of the benevolence-based indicators in 
the operations processes of the MFI.  
 In so far as both forms of benevolence-trust support the empowerment of women, 
they contribute to reducing the risks to women arising out of poverty and lack of 
empowerment (Chakrabarty and Bass, 2014). Table 3 summarizes the factors that constitute 
calculative and relational forms of trust mechanisms in the operations processes of the MFI.   
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Table 2  
 
Summary of the benevolence-based trust indicators in the operations processes  
 
 
Operations Processes     Benevolence-based Observations 
 
 
Pre-Lending The Joint Liability Group (JLG) model of microcredit 
delivery entails empowering credit-clients: The members 
are empowered to select the members of their group, and 
thus participate in decision-making for group formation.  
 
Lending-Savings Self-Help Groups (SHG) are empowered through creating 
awareness about the benefits of savings and connecting the 
SHGs to banks for opening accounts and receiving bank 
loans. 
 
Lending 1 (Defaults) 
(sub-process)  
Involvement/participation of JLG members in resolving 
default issues (decision-making) points to the empowerment 
of members. If unable to make good the default amount, 
members are not pressurized to make payments on behalf of 
the defaulting member (no coercion of members is part of 
the MFI rules & regulations).    
  
Lending 2 
(sub-process) 
The JLG members graduate to higher loan-amounts based 
upon past credit discipline performance.  This indicates 
empowerment of the members by providing incentive 
through maintaining and learning about credit-discipline.  
  
Compulsory Group Training 1 Training (through information exchange) about the 
product/JLG operations/responsibilities of clients is 
provided. This indicates empowerment of members through 
information exchange/training.  
 
Compulsory Group Training 2 Making clients grasp the loan transaction intricacies 
through repeated information reiterations. This indicates 
member empowerment through repeated information 
exchange.  
 
Business Feasibility Survey The MFI engages various community organizations and 
potential members for survey information through 
information exchange (without raising false hopes or 
expectations of the community regarding potential 
microcredit start-up): These are first steps in building 
community networks.   
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Promotional Meeting 
 
Microcredit (Loans) information disbursement involving 
high engagement of potential clients through use of 
proverbs, role-playing, and stories. No microcredit jargon is 
used. Different client interaction methods are used to hold 
audience interest, and make them feel comfortable. The 
methods (high client engagement methods) are used 
indicate benevolence with an aim to raise awareness of 
microcredit in potential clients. 
 
Group Formation Engagement with clients in recognition of the importance of 
building relationships with clients; emphasis on learning 
from clients about local conditions (building relationships 
through information exchange).   
 
Loan Appraisal Engagement with client’s family to ensure that the family 
supports client’s JLG membership. This process attempts to 
avoid future family pressures/problems that may occur 
owing to the client’s JLG membership. This indicates 
creating external support mechanisms through engagement 
and consultation. 
 
Grievance Redress Process Two levels (local and head office) procedures for effective 
grievance resolution are explained to the clients.  
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Figure 1 Analysis of benevolence trust into calculative and relational forms of trust 
Benevolence 
Calculative 
Trust 
Relational 
Trust 
Empowerment 
Creating support 
mechanisms: 
 
Connecting SHGs to banks 
 
Employment skills training 
 
Ensuring family support for 
client’s JLG membership 
 
Involvement in decision 
making: 
Client’s ability to select group 
members 
Information Exchange: 
Raising awareness (through 
story-telling, role-playing) 
Training 
Learning from clients 
Engaging community 
organizations and potential 
clients 
Networking 
 
 
Rules, Regulations & 
Procedures: 
MFI’s behavioural norms 
(code of conduct: 
organizational values) 
Grievance procedure 
Members not unduly 
pressurized to make good 
default payment 
 
Incentives: 
JLG members can graduate to 
higher loan amounts 
Empowerment 
Empowerment 
Empowerment 
Relational 
Trust 
Calculative 
Trust 
Calculative 
Trust 
Calculative 
Trust 
Calculative 
Trust 
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Table 3 
Summary of indicators showing use of calculative and relational forms of trust actions 
                      
                      Calculative Trust    Relational Trust
 
 
 Clients’ ability to select group members  
 Ensuring family-support for client 
membership 
 Raising awareness (through story-telling, 
role-playing, use of proverbs)  
 Loans Training  
 Learning from Clients about local 
conditions  
 Engaging community organizations and 
potential clients through networking  
 JLG members can potentially graduate to 
higher loan amounts (incentives offered) 
 Repayment collection facility within JLG 
members’ residence location 
 Connecting SHGs to banks 
 Employment Skills Training 
 MFI’s behavioural norms (code of 
conduct; organizational values)  
 Grievance redress procedure 
 Members not pressurized to make good 
default payment 
 
 
 
 
 
  Note: From data analysis of benevolence trust
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 Competence-based Effectiveness 
 Table 4 illustrates that the MFI’s functional roles and responsibilities indicate 
competencies in micro-credit lending and networking skills for building community ties. The 
roles, responsibilities, and skills of MFI employees play a vital role in the empowerment of 
women, and the everyday functioning of the MFI.  
 MFI clients borrow for trade as well as emergency needs and other social needs such 
as meeting wedding expenses. Thus, expertise in understanding the client needs and devising 
the right loan product as specified in Table 4 is critical. Gaining family and community 
support for borrowers’ engagement with the MFI, providing training to the clients, spreading 
micro-credit awareness through story-telling are some of the examples that indicate 
competence in networking and building trust-based relationships. Loan recovery processes, 
and default management not only require micro-credit (i.e. financial) skills, but also need 
strong people-oriented skills. Thus, the roles, and responsibilities assigned to various 
functional personnel play a critical role in demonstrating skills that contribute to achieving 
the dual goals of microfinance. 
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Table 4 
 
Competence-based indicators in the operations processes 
 
 
Operations Processes     Competence Indicators 
 
 
Loan Product Planning The process of loan-planning includes the type of credit-
product, the price (interest rates), the process and place of loan 
disbursement, the process and place of loan collection, and the 
parameters of the purpose of loans. This indicates 
organizational core-competency in the loans and credit 
business.  
 
Roles and Responsibilities 
(Organizational Structure) 
The core-team of managers of the MFI are responsible for 
planning day-to-day operations to achieve objectives such as 
financial planning, monitoring, and controlling of 
microfinance operations. The task-expertise (based on the 
objectives of the managers) suggests focus on microcredit. 
 
Organizational Functions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following positions within the functional aspects of the 
MFI point to credit and relational task expertise in the 
microfinance business: 
 Operations Manager (deals with all aspects of loan 
operations) 
 Finance Manager 
 MIS Manager (deals with loans/financial reporting) 
 Area Manager  
 Unit Manager       Relational abilities critical to     
 Credit Officer       accomplish field level tasks 
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 Control-based Effectiveness 
 Control-based effectiveness was demonstrated mainly in the operations processes that 
directly impacted financial transactions (see Table 5). Those processes were supported by 
administrative control processes such as ensuring that clients’ information and documents 
were in place. Also, a loan processing fee, insurance fee, and promissory note had to be in 
place before a loan was disbursed. The borrowers were photographed when receiving the 
loan, a process considered as a necessary part of documenting the receipt of a loan. 
 However, more importantly are the recordkeeping and cash-based transactions 
controls that impact the process of empowerment of the clients. The clients lack of literacy 
necessitates that accurate records of what borrowers owe and repay be kept. Cash-based loan 
recovery processes are open to potential misplacement of funds, and therefore appropriate 
controls are necessary to ensure that clients do not suffer any negative impact due to a lack of 
appropriate control processes. 
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Table 5 
Summary of Control-based indicators in the operations processes   
 
 
Operations Processes     Control Indicators 
 
 
Pre-Lending Discretionary power with management to reject JLG 
membership decided by the joint liability group (JLG). 
Verification of five potential clients (a maximum of 5 
members form a JLG group) according to MFI criteria: for 
example, not more than two persons from the same family 
can belong to a JLG, a client should own their own home 
(or the husband should own the house) and if 
accommodation is rented, the client should have resided at 
the same address for a minimum of 2 years. 
The verification is conducted according to the rules and 
regulations of the MFI credit-granting process. 
 
Lending 2 (sub-process) The MFI ensures that the clients live in a certain vicinity of 
a geographical location where the MFI conducts its 
operations. This is based on the rules and regulations of the 
credit-granting process.   
 
Compulsory Group Training 2 Clients do not have a choice whether to attend compulsory 
group training or not. Clients are also required to submit 
requisite documents such as KYC (know your client); 
insurance receipt, loan processing fee, and promissory note. 
These are also mandatory aspects of the rules and 
regulations related to the loan-granting process.   
 
Loan Product Strategy The nature of the credit product, interest rates charged, fees 
charged, and insurance requirements are entirely under MFI 
management discretion.   
 
Group Test The group test (about knowledge of rules and loan process) 
is mandatory; clients do not have a choice. This is part of 
the rules and regulations related to the MFI credit-granting 
process.  
 
Loan Appraisal The Unit Manager checks the locations/existence of the 
homes of prospective clients. Verification checks are made 
on prospective client’s assets and income activities as noted 
on the loan application form. This process is conducted in 
line with the rules and regulations of the MFI credit-
granting process. 
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Loan Sanction Based upon the appraisal done by Unit Manager, he or she 
will make a recommendation for the loan. This will be sent 
to the Operations Manager and Area Manager for 
verification. Here past loan history and other details 
according to loan granting criteria will be checked and the 
loan will be sanctioned by the Area Manager. The loan 
sanction process is highly structured through rules, 
regulations, and procedural requirements.   
 
Loan Disbursement The MFI has strict rules and regulations regarding the 
disbursement process.  For example, a loan can be 
disbursed only in the office in the presence of Unit 
Manager, Finance Officer, and Cluster Co-ordinator; 
disbursement will happen only in the presence of all the 
JLG members; requisite documents need to be collected 
before a loan is disbursed (loan processing fees, insurance 
fees/receipts, promissory note)   
 
Loan Utilization Verification of loan utilization is done according to the 
rules and regulations prescribed by MFI management. The 
loan utilization verification takes place at least three times a 
year.  
 
Loan Collection The days, times, and places of repayment collection are 
decided by management. This process is fixed at the time of 
area approval. This process is part of the rules and 
regulations regarding the loan management process. 
 
Loan Pre-Closures There are rules and regulations regarding the pre-closure of 
loans. Pre-closures are allowed only in a few exceptional 
circumstances. 
 
Default Management A process for default management is in place according to 
the rules and regulations of the MFI. While members are 
not forced to make up for the default (if the members 
decline to repay), the act of not paying may have 
implications on potential future loans. The members are 
also asked if they could make good the default amount 
through other means.  
 
Cash Management Purely administrative task: the process is in MFI staff-
management control.  
 
Record Keeping and 
Monitoring 
Purely administrative task: the process is in MFI staff-
management control. 
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 Trust-Control Balance Effectiveness 
 The overall percentages for each category of trust-control observations are 
summarized in Table 6, and diagrammatically represented in Figure 2. The observations 
indicate that the managers of the MFI, in order to achieve empowerment of clients and 
financial self-sustainability, focus on trust-sustaining actions complimented by control 
mechanisms, albeit with different emphasis on each of the trust-control categories. The 
differences in emphasis do not reflect managerial preference of one mechanism over another, 
but they indicate actions within specific MFI operations processes that respond to the needs 
of meeting the FSS goal and the social goal of empowerment of clients. Table 7 summarizes 
some of the factors that suggest trust-based effectiveness, control based effectiveness, and the 
combined trust-control effectiveness in the operations processes of the MFI. The combined 
trust-control based effectiveness is derived from treating calculative-trust based actions as 
subtle forms of control (Sydow, 2006).  
 
 
Table 6 
 
 Overall trust-control indicators identified in the Operations Processes of the MFI 
  
 
                                        
 
  
Integrity-based 
indicators  
Benevolence-
based indicators 
Competence-
based indicators 
Control-based 
indicators  
 
Pre-Lending Operation 
Processes 
 
17% 41% 25% 17% 
Lending Operations 
Processes 
 
10% 11% 16% 63% 
Auxiliary Operations 
Processes 
20% 40% 40% 0% 
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Table 7 
 
Operations Processes and Activities Signifying Control-based Effectiveness, Trust-based 
Effectiveness, and Combined Trust-Control-based Effectiveness
 
Control-based Effectiveness      Trust-based Effectiveness         Combined Trust & Control- 
                                 based Effectiveness
 
 
Formulating operational loan 
strategies: interest rates, loan 
disbursements and collection 
points, group training rules 
etc. 
 
Conducting loan appraisals 
 
Sanctioning loans 
 
Disbursing loans 
 
Utilizing loans 
 
Collections/Repayments 
Acting on loan pre-closures 
 
Managing defaults 
 
Managing cash 
 
Record keeping, accounting 
processes, and monitoring 
activities 
 
 
Providing support 
mechanisms such as helping 
to connect self-help-groups 
to banks; providing training 
for developing employability 
skills to MFI clients and 
potential clients 
 
Undertaking business 
feasibility surveys in the 
community 
 
Informing community about 
the benefits and 
responsibilities associated 
with undertaking 
microfinance loans 
(with gaining access to 
credit) 
  
Redressing grievances 
through transparent processes 
 
Creating awareness among 
employees and clients of the 
importance of the employee 
code of conduct  
 
Forming JLG groups: Clients 
are empowered to select their 
own members in the group; 
however, MFI retains veto 
power to reject a member. 
 
Ensuring family support for 
the clients (a socio-cultural 
necessity); facilitates lending  
 
Raising awareness among 
clients about microfinance 
through story-telling and/or 
proverb-using; promotes 
lending  
 
Providing training to the 
clients about the loan-
product, and making clients 
understand the 
responsibilities of both 
parties in entering into a loan 
contract; instils loan-
discipline 
 
Learning from clients about 
their current circumstances 
that helps strengthen 
relationships, and at the same 
time ensure that the MFI is 
aware of any potential 
problems that may lead to 
defaults (networking skills 
are essential in this process). 
 
Engaging community 
organizations and potential 
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clients through networking to 
achieve critical microfinance 
objectives such as loan 
sanctioning, loan 
repayments, and loan 
utilizations.  
   
Demonstration of credit-
discipline by clients used as 
an incentive to graduate to 
higher loan entitlements.  
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Discussion 
 The main features of the discussion that follows are summarized below in Table 8. A 
model that connects the overall linkages among the MFI’s operations processes, trust-control 
mechanisms, mission drift, and clients’ trust-based vulnerabilities is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 Integrity-based Effectiveness 
 Integrity-based effectiveness in the operations processes of the MFI requires that the 
MFIs’ actions demonstrate commitment to the implicit and explicit promises made to their 
clients. In the case of the MFI under study, such consistency is maintained by demonstrating 
that interest rates charged to the clients are fair, training is provided as stipulated in the 
procedural documents, and accurate loan-records are kept in order that clients who cannot 
read or write can confidently engage in loan transactions with the MFI. The MFI also ensures 
that clients do not fall into an unsustainable debt-trap and that coercive methods are not used 
for loan repayments.  
The basic conditions under which the integrity-based approach is maximized is 
through maintaining transparency, and monitoring information-exchange processes in its 
operations. The maintenance of those conditions is contingent upon top management 
remaining committed to integrity-based effectiveness. Information exchange therefore plays a 
vital role in calibrating information-asymmetry between the MFI and its clients, and 
demonstrating consistency between the claims made by the managers and the implementation 
of those claims in the field-level operations.  
 Interactions of integrity with other categories of trust-control effectiveness such as 
benevolence, competence, and control point to the centrality of an integrity-based approach to 
the MFI’s operations. For example, benevolent actions based in calculative trust such as loan-
related training for the clients, and engaging community members to seek support for the 
clients could be negatively impacted without management’s commitment to implement those 
processes to achieve the empowerment of the clients. Similarly, relational-trust would be 
impacted negatively if managers did not show commitment to support services such as 
training for generating self-employment or did not seek family support for the clients.     
Competence in networking skills to build strong community ties, and good skills in carrying 
out micro-credit activities without commitment to keeping its promises would make the MFI 
an unreliable partner. Similarly, well-maintained records and related control mechanisms 
would help clients engage confidently with the MFI. However, if the MFI is seen as not being 
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able to keep its promises, it would soon lose its credibility as a reliable partner. Therefore, the 
impact of integrity-based approach is pervasive in all other trust-control related categories 
and thus has an effect all operations process.         
Proposition 1 
 Integrity-trust based effectiveness depends upon MFI managers’ commitment to 
maintain transparency in the operations processes, monitor information exchange processes, 
and reduce information asymmetry between the MFI and the borrowers.  
 Benevolence-based Effectiveness 
 Benevolence effectiveness requires that operations processes of MFI indicate that the 
client-oriented relational-trust sustaining mechanisms are in place such that the operations 
processes are not exclusively focussed only on achieving financial targets. The condition 
under which benevolence is most effective is when the MFI demonstrates effective 
networking capabilities that enable it to build a strong client-orientation and community ties. 
The provisions of extra support services that go beyond the minimal requirements of micro-
credit lending empower the clients. Some examples of extra support services include ensuring 
family support for the client, engaging community organizations, and providing training such 
as tailoring and henna-painting for weddings to generate self-employment. Equally, 
procedures for addressing grievance need to be in place. Figure 1 summarizes the analysis of 
benevolence based trust in the operations processes of the MFI. However, the effectiveness of 
networking capabilities is contingent upon effective implementation of rules, regulations, and 
procedures that ensure that parameters of specified behavioural expectations are observed 
when engaging with the clients. The benevolence based approach is also contingent upon 
effective information exchange (e.g. provision of training, and obtaining community and 
family support for the client), and monitoring of the processes that sustain benevolence 
effect. 
 Interactions of benevolence with other trust-control categories such as integrity, 
competence, and control are instructive. Lack of empowerment of the clients through 
calculative and relational based trust would negatively impact the good intentions and 
management commitment to integrity-based approach. Management’s competence would 
also come under scrutiny if relational-based outcomes are ineffective. Equally, the 
effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms would be questioned if benevolence-based actions 
fail to build strong relationships with the clients.            
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Proposition 2 
 The benevolence effectiveness of the MFI depends upon managers’ ability to calibrate 
calculative and relational forms of trust in order to empower the borrowers.  
 Competence-based Effectiveness 
 The conditions under which competence-based trust is most effective is when MFI 
personnel are able to competently carry out micro-credit activities such as credit-distribution, 
collection, training, and default management. At the same time, networking skills that 
demonstrate competences in securing family support and community support for the clients 
are critical in micro-lending activities.   
 However, the success of competence-related activities is contingent upon devising 
appropriate loan-product strategy, effective information exchange, and monitoring 
procedures. To avoid clients going into debt-trap, the loan-product has to be such that it fits 
the purpose for which the client intends to use the loan, and it takes account of the client’s 
ability to repay the loan. Monitoring loan schedules and the client’s performance (i.e. trade 
performance or other emergency uses of the loan) is also contingent upon an ongoing 
information-exchange between the MFI and the clients.        
 Interactions of competence with integrity, benevolence, and control-based 
effectiveness points to competence as a critical factor in achieving the dual goals of the MFI. 
An integrity-based approach without competence would make the operations processes 
ineffective, impacting client-confidence in the MFI. The execution of benevolence-based 
actions such as provision of training and/or networking capacity could be undermined by the 
lack of competence. Equally, incompetence in maintaining appropriate financial controls 
could negatively impact clients’ trust and confidence in the MFI. 
Proposition 3 
 The competence-based effectiveness of the MFI depends upon managers’ capabilities 
that demonstrate financial skills which understand micro-lending tasks, and networking skills 
that forge strong relationships with the clients and the community. 
 Control-based Effectiveness 
 Control-based effectiveness in the MFIs’ operations processes necessitates that 
appropriate financial administrative controls are in place so that the clients’ records and loan 
schedules accurately reflect the current status of their commitments. Financial controls are 
also necessary so that the MFI can, at any given time, know the current status of its own FSS   
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performance. The condition under which the control mechanisms are most effective is when 
managers and other employees of the MFI are committed to upholding the rules, regulations, 
and procedures devised for lending and related activities. Those conditions are contingent 
upon monitoring lending activities of the MFI. Achievement of social goals, on the other 
hand, is underpinned by calculative-trust based mechanisms that provide subtle forms of 
control. Monitoring is contingent upon adhering to rules, regulations and procedures devised 
for lending and related activities. The other contingency factors impacting monitoring 
activities are good quality information systems and effective information-exchange so as to 
enable the MFI to keep accurate and timely records of its financial activities. 
 Ineffective financial control mechanisms would lead the MFI in not being able to 
meet its financial commitments and thus negatively impact integrity-based approaches. A 
similar impact could be expected from an MFI not being able to deliver on its benevolence-
related activities. The MFI’s competence would also come under question if its financial 
commitments are not honoured.  
Proposition 4 
 The control-based effectiveness of the MFI depends upon MFI managers’ and 
employees commitment to upholding the rules, regulations, and procedures for lending 
activities within the context of poverty of the borrowers, and monitoring those processes. 
 
 
. 
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Table 8 
 
Trust-control analysis  
 
 
 Context 
 
 
Conditions Contingencies Interactions Client Vulnerabilities 
Integrity-
Trust 
Operations 
processes 
 
Transparency, 
Accessibility, 
Monitoring, 
Information 
exchange 
Management 
commitment, 
Consistency between 
claims and field-level 
operations’ actions 
 
Benevolence, 
Competence and 
Control-based 
effectiveness 
Breaking Promises, lack of transparency, 
and weak monitoring systems could 
initiate mission drift 
Benevolence
-Trust 
Operations 
processes 
 
Networking, Support 
Services 
Rules, regulations & 
procedures,  
Monitoring, 
Information exchange  
Integrity, 
Competence, and 
Control-based 
effectiveness 
Indebtedness, undue pressure for debt 
collections, lack of support services would 
dilute relational trust and create mission 
drift 
 
Competence
-Trust 
Operations 
processes 
 
Micro-credit lending 
skills, Networking 
(strong community 
ties)  
Loan-product strategy 
(product fit for 
clients), Monitoring, 
Information exchange 
Integrity, 
Benevolence, and 
Control-based 
effectiveness 
Lack of competence in meeting either the 
financial goal or client oriented relational 
goal resulting in mission drift  
 
 
Control 
 
Operations 
processes 
 
 
Rules/regulations 
Quality of 
information (systems 
& exchange) 
 
Monitoring lending 
activities   
 
Integrity,  
Benevolence, and 
Competence-
based   
effectiveness 
Lack of monitoring could create loans-
related information inaccuracies that short-
change the clients’ interests   
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Locating mission drift mitigation in an ethical context 
 Trust-building and control mechanisms are used by the managers of the microfinance 
institution (MFI) to achieve the dual goals of social development and financial self 
sustainability in order to mitigate mission drift. Those mechanisms help develop and sustain 
trustworthiness of the MFI. According to Flores and Solomon (1997, p. 53) trustworthiness 
depends on collective acceptance because it is dependent upon interpretation by those who 
care to trust. In balancing trust-control mechanisms, the MFI, through transparency and 
integrity-based approaches attempt to signal that it is a trustworthy entity. For example, the 
MFI’s code of conduct, grievance address procedures, open-forums where clients are able to 
interact directly with the senior managers and measures to build relational trust by 
empowering clients through training are indicators of attempts to establish its trustworthiness. 
Those measures are put forward for collective acceptance by the clients, and they are also a 
declaration of intent for fair treatment of the clients. The norms of fairness in such measures 
as code of conduct, and open-forums are necessary to protect client-vulnerabilities in a trust-
based relationship with the MFI. According to Banerjee et al. (2006, p. 311), “Unethical 
behaviour is proving you are untrustworthy by reneging on or deceiving the trustor of the 
fairness norms being applied to his or her vulnerability in this situation.” 
 Additionally, the power differential and information asymmetry that exist between an 
MFI and its clients potentially create a high client dependency on an MFI. The poverty and 
illiteracy of the clients (i.e. the negative context suggested by Chakrabarty and Bass, 2014) 
necessitate them to place high level of trust in a MFI. The ethical dimension of mission drift 
mitigation becomes crucial when the process of mitigating mission drift is perceived within 
the context of achieving social and FSS goals, and protecting clients’ vulnerabilities in their 
trust relationship with the MFI. According to Banerjee et al. (2006): 
A trustworthy party is one that will not unfairly exploit vulnerabilities of the other 
parties in the relationship. Ethics enter into the picture when we need to decide what 
counts as an unjust or unfair exploitation of the vulnerability of one of the parties in 
the trust relationship. What counts as an example of excessive opportunism in that 
context? The non-vulnerable parties in the relationship have a moral obligation not 
to unfairly exploit the vulnerable parties (p. 308). 
 In the case of a MFI, a goal of profitability which drives clients into incurring 
unsustainable indebtedness, uses coercive collection practices, fails to get family and 
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community support for the clients, and does not attempt to bridge critical information 
asymmetries between itself and its clients, would count as unjust exploitation of clients’ 
vulnerabilities. Such exploitation would constitute mission drift in the context of a MFIs’ 
social mission. Boatright (2002), in writing on finance ethics, suggests that when financial 
institutions sell financial products such as loans “ordinary standards for ethical sales practices 
apply” (p. 157). Boatright further argues that “[Thus], the financial service industry, like any 
business, has an obligation to refrain from deception and to make adequate disclosure of 
material information” (p. 157). 
 In case of an MFI, the pertinent questions are what is the interest-rate threshold that 
could be considered to be fair within the context of micro-credit? What specific actions could 
be considered as coercive practice in collection of loan repayments? What level of 
information sharing with the clients should be considered as meeting the fairness principle? 
 Banerjee et al. (2006) make a strong case for applying mutually agreed norms of 
fairness through transparency as an ethical principle to decide what counts as ethical or not. 
They argue that those norms should be publicly advocated and adopted by all parties to be 
considered as fair (p. 309). They contend:  
In situations of trust, the key is to eliminate information asymmetries regarding 
norms of fairness. If a vulnerable party enters into trusting relationship with a 
different understanding from the stronger party of what constitutes exploitation of 
trust, he or she will be deceived. Deception regarding norms of fairness is morally 
wrong (p. 310). 
Table 9 illustrates the methods used by the MFI in this research to reduce information 
asymmetry between itself and the borrowers.  
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Table 9  
 
Methods used by the MFI to bridge information asymmetry 
 
 
 
Repeated training of the clients in the 
functions, operations, and the financial 
aspects of the loan 
 
 
The code of conduct is explicitly posted in 
offices at all sites of the MFI 
Group test to ensure that the clients fully 
grasp the content of the training 
 
The grievance procedure is made explicit 
during training and is documented 
The rules of loan defaults are clearly 
explained and documented  
 
The open forum allows the clients to directly 
interact with the senior managers of the MFI 
 Financial information is made publicly 
available in the offices and on the internet   
 
   
  
 Integrity and Mission Drift Mitigation  
 The integrity-based effectiveness in this study is seen as the MFI managers’ ability to 
demonstrate consistency between the claims they make and the actions they perform in their 
operations processes. Thus, an integrity-based approach in this study expects that the 
managers of the MFI are able to keep the explicit and implicit promises they make to their 
clients in their attempts to mitigate mission drift. According to De George (1993), acting with 
integrity is synonymous with acting ethically and morally. He further argues that acting with 
integrity involves more than the bare minimum required by the self-imposed norms of an 
organization. He contends that it is not possible to prescribe how much more than the bare 
minimum is required. However, he goes on to suggest that:  
But beyond what is required exists a sphere of actions that are morally praiseworthy 
though not required. This sphere, which we might call the ideal, challenges the 
person or firm of integrity to do more than minimum. And those with integrity will 
rise in to that sphere at least to some extent (p. 7).  
 In the context of De George’s (1993) definition of integrity, the integrity-based 
effectiveness of the MFI can be said to go beyond the bare minimum required in fulfilling its 
promises. The rising into the sphere that goes beyond the bare minimum is evidenced in the 
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case of the MFI in its benevolence-based effectiveness that includes offering skills 
development training for self-employment, and offering an HIV-AIDS prevention program at 
the Gandhidham site of the MFI. These examples point to the integrity-based approach that 
goes beyond the bare minimum required of the MFI.         
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Figure 2. Linkages  
Among Operations  
Processes, Trust- 
Control 
Mechanisms, Client 
Vulnerabilities, and 
Mission Drift  
Mitigation   
Trust-Control 
Mechanisms 
Client Vulnerability (risks) in Trust Relationship with MFI 
Integrity based:  MFI not keeping promises such as: charging exploitative interest rates, employing 
coercive collection methods, creating debt-trap.  
Benevolence based:  Training not provided , family and community support for the clients not obtained 
Competence based:  Lack of micro-lending experience/expertise could make a MFI less sensitive to 
clients’ emergency financial needs versus their entrepreneurial financial needs. 
Networking skills could be used to bring undue pressure on defaulting client.  
Control based:  Weak financial control administration can be vulnerable to inaccurate loan-
records. Funds could be misappropriated from cash-based lending and collection 
practices.  
Micro-Credit 
Operations Processes
 
 
Balance between Trust-
Sustaining and Financial Control 
Mechanisms 
 
 
 Integrity 
Effectiveness 
 Benevolence 
Effectiveness 
 Competence 
Effectiveness 
 Control 
Effectiveness 
Relational Trust  
  
Empowerment 
Calculative       
Trust 
Pre-Lending 
Processes 
Mission Drift 
Mitigation 
Lending 
Processes 
Input 
 Process 
Output 
Auxiliary 
Processes 
 Conclusion 
 Mission-drift mitigation in MFIs necessitates building strong trust-based relationships 
with the clients complemented by effective control mechanisms to achieve financial self-
sustainability. Thus, a framework of trust-control mechanisms was adopted to explore how 
the MFI’s operations processes respond to the needs of fulfilling the FSS and the social goal. 
Such a view has been supported by field data derived from the MFI’s operations on the 
ground in four different sites. The observations were supplemented by focus group 
discussions and annual reports of the MFI. Four branches of the MFI in two different parts of 
the state of Gujarat in India were explored to achieve replication of the results. The data 
indicated that managers of the MFI use various combinations of integrity, benevolence, and 
competence-based trust mechanisms, complemented by control-based mechanisms in a 
variety of operations processes to achieve social and FSS goals. Those findings were further 
discussed to present four propositions which indicate (a) the centrality of integrity, 
benevolence and competence-based trust in achieving the MFI’s dual goals, and (b) the 
importance of balancing trust-control mechanisms to mitigate mission-drift. The results of the 
data were used to construct a model that shows the linkages among the MFI’s operations 
processes, trust-control mechanisms, mission drift, and clients’ trust based vulnerabilities.  
 The findings are limited by the context of multi-site embedded case study approach 
adopted in this study. First, the implication of studying trust-control mechanisms in the 
operations processes is that it necessarily excludes other organizational domains such as 
strategic policy-making, governance processes, and/or human resource processes. Locating 
trust in the operations processes necessarily excludes cross-level organizational trust (Currall 
and Inkpen, 2006) within the MFI thereby constricting internal generalizability. This is 
consistent with Kramer’s (2010, p. 85) contention that studying trust in a collective 
organizational sense, and its understanding is complicated by the fact that there are many 
trustors, many trustees, and many organizational domains in which trust can be situated. 
Second, the limitations of employing the most widely used trust constructs in this study are 
that the use of a specific conceptual framework necessarily subordinates and/or excludes 
other concepts that indicate trustworthiness such as justice, fairness, reputation, and value-
congruence. Also, in adopting a trust-control framework, this study takes a managerial and 
organizational perspective, and thereby excludes the perceptions of the clients regarding the 
trustworthiness of the MFI. Third, generalizability of the findings is limited by use of one 
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multi-site case study. However, in this study, literal replication was aimed at achieving 
analytical generalization as opposed to statistical generalization (Yin, 1994, p. 46).              
 More future studies through case study methodology can explore trust-control 
dynamics in other organizational domains helping to build a holistic view of coordination 
activities in organizations. A longitudinal research design could also explore how trust 
dynamics in one domain impacts other organizational domains. Additionally, a survey 
method through questionnaires, within the case study, could also give insights into the 
nuanced perspectives of managers on trust-control linkages within organizations.    
 The purpose of this research was not to discount the importance of traditional 
corporate and social governing mechanisms as an instrument of mission drift mitigation. 
Rather, the point was to demonstrate that building and sustaining trust with the clients of 
MFIs accompanied by appropriate control mechanisms offers a more nuanced understanding 
of the day to day challenges which managers of the MFI face in achieving the social and FSS 
goals.  
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